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Abstract—One of the emergent prospects for active 
distribution networks is to establish new roles to the distribution 
company (Disco). The Disco can act as an aggregator of the 
resources existing in the distribution network, also when parts of 
the network are structured and managed as microgrids (MGs). 
The new roles of the Disco may open the participation of the 
Disco as a player trading energy in the wholesale markets, as well 
as in local energy markets. In this paper, the decision making 
aspects involving the Disco are addressed by proposing a bi-level 
optimization approach in which the Disco problem is modeled as 
the upper-level problem and the MGs problems and day-ahead 
wholesale market clearing process are modeled as the lower-level 
problems. To include the uncertainty of renewable energy 
sources, a risk-based two-stage stochastic problem is formulated, 
in which the Disco’s risk aversion is modeled by using the 
conditional value at risk. The resulting non-linear bi-level model 
is transformed into a linear single-level one by applying the 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions and the duality theory. The 
effectiveness of the model is shown in the application to the IEEE 
33-bus distribution network connected to the IEEE RTS 24-bus 
power system.  
 
Index Terms—Active distribution networks, wholesale market, 
microgrids, Bi-level approach, Two-stage stochastic model, Risk 
management. 
NOMENCLATURE 
Acronyms 
CVaR/VaR Conditional Value at Risk/Value at Risk 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷/𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 Day-ahead energy market/Real-time energy market 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅/𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 Distributed energy resource/Distributed generator 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 Distribution Company 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷/𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷          Distribution network/Distribution network load 
𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 Demand response 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 Distribution system operator 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 Energy storage 
𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 Generation Company 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 Interruptible load 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 Independent system operator 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷/𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 Lower/Upper level 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿/𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿        Local market price/Market clearing price 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 Mixed integer linear programming 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷/𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷/𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 Microgrid/Microgrid load/Microgrid operator 
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 Renewable energy source 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀/𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 Total cost/Expected total cost  
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷/𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷           Transmission network/Transmission network load 
Indices and Sets 
𝑏𝑏/𝐵𝐵         Index/set of energy and offers/bids block of Genco/TNL 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝐷𝐷, ℎ)         Mapping of each bus h connected to bus i 
𝑑𝑑/𝐷𝐷                   Index/set of TNL 
𝐷𝐷, ℎ                     Indices of DN buses 
𝑔𝑔/𝐷𝐷                   Index/set of Genco 
𝑗𝑗/𝐽𝐽                     Index/set MG 
𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐺𝐺/𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷 Set of Genco/TNL located at bus n 
𝐺𝐺,𝐷𝐷/𝑟𝑟,𝑅𝑅           Index and set of TN buses 
𝑡𝑡/𝑅𝑅                    Index/set of time period 
𝜔𝜔/𝑊𝑊                 Index/set of scenario 
𝛬𝛬 𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇                  Set of buses directly connected to TN bus n 
Parameters  
𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛−𝑟𝑟  Susceptance of TN line n-r (per unit) 
𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏,𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 /𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏,𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇   Offer/bid price block of Genco/TNL ($/MWh) 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼/𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼    Bid price of ILs ($/MWh) 
𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺/𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸  Bid price of DG/ES ($/MWh) 
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡  Duration of time t (hour) 
𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸/ 𝐷𝐷 𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸  Maximum/Minimum energy stored in ES (MWh) 
𝑓𝑓 𝑛𝑛−𝑟𝑟 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇   Capacity limit of each TN line n-r (MW) 
𝐼𝐼?̅?𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇                     Maximum limitation of DN feeder current (kA) 
𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇/𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇            Max demand/size of TNL energy block (MW) 
𝐿𝐿�𝑔𝑔/ 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏,𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇               Max production/size of Genco energy block (MW) 
𝐿𝐿
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷/𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷Limitations of Disco power exchange with market (MW) 
𝐿𝐿�𝑗𝑗
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷_𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺/ 𝐿𝐿 𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷_𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺 Limitations of Disco power exchange with MGs (MW) 
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡/ 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝜔𝜔𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼     Deterministic/Probabilistic DNL (MW) 
𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼                      Demand of MG (MW) 
𝐿𝐿�𝑗𝑗
𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺/𝐿𝐿  𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺               Power limitations of DG (MW) 
𝐿𝐿�𝑗𝑗
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ/ 𝐿𝐿�𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸ℎ Maximum charging/discharging power of ES (MW) 
𝐿𝐿�𝑡𝑡,𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸/𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸    Maximum output power of RES (MW)/RES operation 
cost ($/MWh) 
𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑔/ 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔      Ramp-up/down limits of Genco (MW/h) 
𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗
𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺/𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 Ramp-up/down limits of DG (MW/h) V𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇/ 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇     Upper/Lower limit of voltage of DN bus (kV) 
𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗,ℎ𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇/𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,ℎ𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇      Impedance/Resistance of DN line (ohm) 
𝛼𝛼/𝛽𝛽               Confidence level/Risk-aversion parameters 
𝛾𝛾𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷/𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺         Maximum load interruption factors of DN/MGs (MW) 
𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼              Selling energy price to demand of MG ($/MWh) 
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼              Selling energy price to DNL ($/MWh) 
𝜓𝜓𝜔𝜔                 Occurrence probability of each scenario  
Variables 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷      Offer/bid price of Disco to wholesale market ($/MWh) 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷_𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺      Offer/bid price of Disco to MGs ($/MWh) 
𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸            The amount of energy stored in ES (MWh) 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗,ℎ𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 /𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗,ℎ𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇_𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛  DN feeder current/linearized current (kA/kA2) 
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹     Active power flow moves from bus i to bus h (MW) 
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇           Active power flow moves from bus h to bus i (MW) 
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗,ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷           The amount of active power losses (MW) 
𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 , 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇    The amount of TNL and its block (MW) 
𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇,𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏,𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇   Output power of Genco and its block (MW) 
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷       Disco power exchange from wholesale market (MW) 
𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷_𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺       Disco power exchange to MGs (MW) 
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝜔𝜔𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼        The amount of load interruption of Disco (MW) 
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𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸          Output power of RESs (MW) 
𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼       The amount of load interruption in each MG (MW) 
𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺           Output power of DGs (MW) 
𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ/𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸ℎ   Power charging/discharging of ES (MW) 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇/ 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡.𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇_𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛  DN bus voltage/linearized voltage (kA/kV2) 
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡              The amount of load shifting factor 
𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡           Angle of TN bus voltage (rad) 
𝜆𝜆𝐹𝐹,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷     MCP or LMP at the TN bus m where the Disco is located 
𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷_𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺     Local market price 
𝜉𝜉 ,𝜂𝜂𝜔𝜔        Auxiliary variables used in CVaR calculation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Motivation and aim 
N the current evolution of the electrical distribution 
systems, distributed energy resources (DERs) and 
microgrids (MGs) are playing increasingly important roles. 
In this evolving framework, the distribution companies 
(Discos) will have to change their characteristics with respect 
to the past. There is an increasing trend to create multi-energy 
systems that may take benefits from the coordinated operation 
of electricity together with other energy carriers. 
Correspondingly, there is a trend to decentralize the decision-
making concerning energy management in localized areas, 
under the coordination of specific aggregators. This situation 
is also promoting the birth of local energy markets, in which 
multiple entities (Discos, large consumers, aggregators) are 
competing to provide energy and services to the consumers.  
The evolving role of the Discos is discussed in various 
documents. A specific example is the New York State 
Reforming Energy Vision [1], where the Disco is identified as 
the coordinator of a Distributed System Platform Provider, as 
the interface to connect the relevant entities, from consumers 
to aggregators. In this Disco-centric view, the Platform will 
also coordinate DER markets with the participation of 
competitive energy service providers. Conversely, some 
consumer-centric or MG-centric visions have been developed, 
in which the role of the Disco is considered to be 
progressively lower. These visions include the formation of 
multi-MGs managed by an aggregator [2], the web of cells 
approach [3], up to extreme grid defection [4] scenarios in 
which the local prosumers tend to become independent of the 
grid. The latter possibility is however unlikely to occur, 
because of the cost effectiveness of the centralized distribution 
network due to the economy of scale, together with the 
increasing amount of power that will be needed from the grid 
in the process of progressive electrification that is reaching the 
final user (e.g., to supply heat pumps and electric vehicles). 
Rather, the presence of the distribution network may provide 
new business opportunities to connect new DERs and manage 
them efficiently. In parallel with the evolution of the networks, 
there is a growing interest towards the development of local 
energy systems and markets. In [5] a multi-energy player is 
considered as a DER aggregator, without representing the 
distribution network explicitly (i.e. using a single-node multi-
energy system). In [6] a local energy market is proposed to 
create new opportunities to increase the benefits of sellers and 
consumers through local cooperation, again without 
considering the role of the Disco. 
 The aspects indicated above motivate the interest towards 
studying the evolution of Discos, including the action of 
Discos as possible aggregators, and the Disco interactions with 
local energy markets. 
 The aim of this paper is to model the decision making 
behavior of a Disco in the wholesale day-ahead energy market 
(DAEM) while it interacts with MGs in a local energy market, 
considering the uncertainties of generation from renewable 
energy sources (RESs) and demand.  
B. Literature review and contribution 
The decision-making problem of a Disco that participates as 
a price-taker in the electricity market is modeled in different 
ways. Two-stage deterministic and stochastic optimization 
approaches are proposed in both DAEM and real-time energy 
market (RTEM) in [7] and [8], respectively. Optimal 
scheduling of DERs by the Disco is done regarding the 
forecast prices of DAEM and the reserve markets in [9]. The 
optimal operation of a Disco is modeled in [10] to manage the 
uncertainties of distributed generators (DGs) and loads through 
optimal charging/discharging of energy storage (ES). In [11, 
12], the operation problem of a Disco is modeled through 
optimal trading energy with DER aggregators in which the 
problem of the Disco and the aggregators are formulated as 
the upper-level (UL) and the lower-level (LL) problems, 
respectively. As the UL problem is non-linear, the formulation 
is based on a non-linear model without complementarity. In 
[13], a hierarchical decision-making framework is proposed 
for distribution networks in which a Disco cooperates with 
several MGs. To model such a framework, a bi-level approach 
is used in which the Disco as the upper-level problem 
participates as a price-taker player in the market.  
In the presence of DERs, the Disco can trade energy with 
these resources to reduce the purchased energy from the 
markets. This action changes the bids of the Disco to the 
market, which in turn, may lead to decreasing the wholesale 
energy prices. Therefore, new decision making frameworks 
are required where the Disco participates in wholesale markets 
as a price-maker player. In [14], a deterministic bi-level 
approach is presented where the UL problem is to maximize 
the social welfare of DAEM and the LL problem models the 
interaction between the Disco and DER managers. The 
strategic behavior of a Disco in the DAEM is modeled in [15] 
with a stochastic bi-level approach, and in [16] by considering 
the Disco as the leader and DAEM and RTEM as the 
followers. In [17], the Disco participates in the RTEM as a 
price-maker using a demand response aggregator in the 
distribution network. The solution is obtained with a bi-level 
optimization approach, in which the Disco and the RTEM are 
considered as the leader and the follower, respectively. 
However, RES and demand uncertainties are not considered, 
and the Disco cannot manage the risk of its decision-making. 
In the proposed models for a price-maker Disco, for 
example [14-17], the behavior of DER managers such as 
aggregators and MGs is not modeled. In other words, these 
energy players propose fixed price signals to the Disco, 
regarding which the Disco decides on their optimal scheduling 
and participates in the wholesale markets. However, the 
effects of their optimal behavior on the decisions of the Disco 
and wholesale energy markets are not modeled. 
MGs are appropriate solutions for better management and 
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operation of the DERs to meet the local demand. From the 
viewpoint of the market, MGs receive/offer fixed prices 
from/to the Disco and consequently schedule their resources. 
An MG operator (MGO) can participate in wholesale markets 
individually or through an MG aggregator regarding the 
licenses of the markets. When the MGO participates 
individually, it cannot change the market prices and acts as a 
price-taker regarding the low capacity in trading power with 
the market. On the other hand, in both modes (i.e. individual 
or through an aggregator participation), this behavior of MGs 
faces the independent system operator (ISO) and the 
distribution system operator (DSO) with the operational 
problems since the distribution network constraints have been 
ignored in such models [18]. Although a transmission system 
operator (TSO)-DSO iteration approach is proposed to solve 
this challenge, it leads to heavy operational processes 
endangering the deadline of finishing the market clearing 
process as mentioned in [19]. To overcome these operational 
problems, new local markets can be created in the distribution 
network. These local markets can be managed by the MGO 
receiving bids/offers from DER managers and the Disco. The 
MGO clears the market and decides about the optimal 
scheduling of the DERs and the power trading with the Disco. 
Regarding the response of the MGO, the Disco may change 
the bids/offers to the wholesale and the local markets. In such 
a framework, the impact of the optimal behavior of the MGO 
and the results of the local market can be modeled in the 
wholesale energy markets. Moreover, the impacts of MGOs’ 
decisions on the distribution network constraints can be 
considered in the same framework.  
The main contribution of this paper is the proposal of a 
new operation problem for a Disco to simultaneously model 
its mutual interactions with both wholesale and local energy 
markets managed by the ISO and the MGOs, respectively. The 
framework of this paper simultaneously solves the two 
aforementioned problems: 1) modeling the impact of the 
MGO decisions in the wholesale energy market, and 2) 
modeling the impact of the MGO decisions in the local market 
on the distribution network operation constraints.  
To model such decision-making framework, a risk-based 
bi-level optimization approach is developed. The UL problem 
is the risk minimization for the Disco. The two LL problems 
are the clearing processes of DAEM and local markets. The 
risk-level Disco’s decisions in the presence of uncertainties to 
participate in the wholesale and local markets are managed 
through the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) index. 
C. Paper Organization 
In the rest of this paper, section II presents the problem 
description. Section III shows the mathematical formulation of 
the LL problems. Section IV recalls the formulation of the bi-
level problem as a mathematical problem with equilibrium 
constraints. Section IV reports and discusses the numerical 
studies. Section V concludes the paper. 
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
The Disco-centric decision-making framework is shown in Fig. 
1. The interruptible load (IL) aggregator submits its offer to the 
Disco, and the Disco decides on the amount of load 
curtailment. The Disco sends its offers/bids to the DAEM 
which is cleared by the ISO. After clearing the market, the 
power trading of the Disco with the market is determined. On 
the other hand, for each MG, the DG, the IL, and the ES 
managed by the DER managers submit their offers to the 
MGO. Moreover, the Disco sends the uniform price signal to 
all MGOs, so that the local market price (LMP) becomes equal 
for all. The MGO clears the local energy market regarding the 
offers of the aggregators and the Disco, and then decides on the 
optimal scheduling of DERs and the optimal power trading 
with the Disco. 
Fig. 2 shows the proposed bi-level optimization approach 
and illustrates the internal and the external decision variables 
for each player. The Disco decision-making problem is 
formulated as the UL problem. The wholesale and the local 
energy markets managed by the ISO and MGOs are modeled 
as two separate LL problems. Optimal scheduling of the IL and 
the RESs, the decision variables related to risk management, as 
well as the power flow variables, are internal decisions of the 
Disco. The bids/offers to both the wholesale and the local 
markets are considered as the external variables of the Disco. 
The ISO and MGOs receive the price signals from the Disco 
and clear the markets to decide about power trading with the 
Disco. This decision is considered as the external decision 
variable of both LL problems. Besides, the power generation of 
Gencos, the power consumption of TNL, and the voltage 
angles of TN buses are determined as the internal decision 
variables of the ISO problem. On the other hand, optimal 
scheduling of DGs, ILs, and ESs are considered as the internal 
variables for each MG. 
Day-ahead energy market
Decision variables: power trading with the 
wholesale market, optimal scheduling of IL, 
power trading with MGs
 
Decision variables: power trading with 
Disco, optimal scheduling of DERs
IL aggregator
Forecast data
Technical network data
Disco
Local energy market for each MG
ISO Technical data
Bids/offers
Optimal scheduling
Forecast data
DER technical and 
economic data
DER manager
Forecast data DER technical and economic data
 
Fig. 1. Proposed decision-making framework of Disco in wholesale and local 
energy markets. 
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Local energy market managed by 
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Fig. 2. The internal and external decision variables for each player in the 
proposed bi-level decision-making framework. 
A. Modeling uncertainties 
The probability distribution functions (PDFs) used to 
model the uncertainties of demand, wind speed, and solar 
radiation, are the Normal, Weibull, and irradiance distribution 
models taken from [20, 21]. The Normal PDF has been 
discretized into seven intervals, while the other two PDFs 
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have been discretized into five intervals. Only the mean values 
of each interval are then considered, leading to a discretized 
set of values for each variable. The probability of occurrence 
represented by each discrete value is obtained through 
integration from the mentioned PDFs regarding the lower and 
upper limitations of each interval.  
For each parameter, 24000 samples are generated 
regarding the probability of the intervals. The average value of 
each interval is multiplied with the forecast value of the 
parameter, to show the value of that parameter in each sample. 
Then, the scenario tree construction has been used to generate 
different scenarios, as described in [22]. In this approach, the 
time steps defined in the problem (i.e. 24 hours), and the 
generated samples are used as the scenario tree stages and the 
nodes, respectively, in which a scenario is defined as the path 
among the nodes. Using the scenario tree method, 1000 
scenarios have been generated to model the uncertainties, 
which are then reduced to 15 scenarios using the General 
Algebraic Modeling System/Scenario Reduction 
(GAMS/SCENRED) package and the fast-forward scenario 
reduction technique. Each scenario consists of demand, wind 
speed, and solar radiation data for the time period (24 hours) 
of operation. The probability of occurrence of each scenario 
[20, 23] is shown in Table I. Then, the output power of wind 
turbine (WT) and photovoltaic (PV) arrays are calculated 
using the models proposed in [24]. 
TABLE I 
OCCURRENCE PROBABILITY OF SCENARIOS IN THE DECISION MAKING 
PROBLEM OF THE DISCO 
5 4 3 2 1 # scenario 
0.051 0.091 0.047 0.049 0.061 Probability 
 10 9 8 7 6 # scenario 
0.064 0.065 0.065 0.077 0.085 Probability 
 15 14 13 12 11 # scenario 
0.054 0.063 0.067 0.087 0.074 Probability 
B. Total cost for the Disco 
The Expected Total Cost (ETC) for the Disco is expressed 
as the weighted average of the total costs resulting from all 
scenarios ω = 1, …, W: 
 1
 
W
ETC TC
ω
ωωψ
=
=∑   (1) 
where the total cost (TC) includes the costs of the power 
exchange with the DAEM and MGs, the RES operation cost, 
the cost of load interruption, and the revenues due to the 
energy sold to the consumers: 
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The power balance constraint of the distribution network 
(DN) at the reference bus and at the other buses are formulated 
as (3) and (4), respectively. 
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 The upper bound of the purchased power from the IL 
aggregator by the Disco is expressed as 
                        ,
_ _ , ,0 IL Dis DNL Dett
Dis
tP P tω γ ω≤ ∀≤   (5) 
and the limitations to the RES output power are 
                              , ,0    , .
RE RE
t t
S SP P tω ω ω∀≤≤      (6) 
The distribution network is modeled as in [25]: 
, , , , ,( )   , ,
DN DN DN DN
t i h t i t h i hI V V Z t i h= − ∀             (7) 
, ,, , , , , ,  ,
DN DN DNDNDN DN
i h i h iit i h t iI I I t i h V V V t i− ≤ ≤ ∀ ≤ ≤ ∀    (8) 
      
( )
( ) ( )( )2 2,, , , , , ,2
,
  , ,
DN
i hFm To DN DN
t i h t i h t i t hDN
i h
R
P P V V t i h
Z
− = − ∀                  (9) 
 ( )2, , , , , , ,   , , .Fm To DN DNt i h t i h i h t i hP P R I t i h+ = ∀                    (10) 
The technical constraints related to the distribution 
network are presented as Eqs. (7)-(10). The amount of feeders 
current is determined by (7). The upper and lower limitations 
of current and voltage of the network are modeled by (8). Eq. 
(9) is used to model the amount of active power flows in the 
network. Eq. (10) calculates the amount of power losses in 
each feeder (if 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇  or 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇  ≥0; otherwise is equal to 0). The 
non-linear terms �𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇�2 and �𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 �2 are transformed with 
linear ones regarding the piecewise approach proposed in [25] 
as follows: 
2_
, , ,2   ,
DN Lin DN Lin
i jt i t i t iV V V V V t i= − + + ∆ ∀                (11) 
( )( )_ ,, , , , ,2 1 /    , ,
K DNDN Lin
i ht i h t i h k
k
I k I K I t i h= − ∆ ∀∑              (12) 
where ∆𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛, k, K, and ∆𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,ℎ,𝑘𝑘 describes the square of ∆𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 
(summation of all the piecewise segments of voltage 
magnitude deviation), the piecewise segment number, the total 
number of piecewise segments, and the value of the kth block 
of the current flow magnitude of feeders. 
C. Risk management 
The scenarios generated to model the uncertain parameters 
divide the decisions of the Disco into two steps, consisting of 
before and after the occurrence of the scenarios. To model the 
operation problem of the Disco under uncertainty, a risk-based 
two-stage stochastic optimization approach is used. The bids of 
the Disco to both wholesale and local markets are independent 
of the occurrence of the scenarios, and are considered as the 
first-stage or here-and-now decisions. Conversely, the output 
power of RESs and the amount of load interruption depend on 
each scenario and are considered as the second-stage or wait-
and-see decisions. Since the uncertainties of RESs and demand 
refer to the Disco, they are modelled only in internal decisions 
variables of the Disco including optimal scheduling of IL and 
RESs. In fact, the Disco decides on optimal bidding strategy to 
the DAEM and MGs before the occurrence of the scenarios, 
while the internal decision variables are found after the 
occurrence of the scenarios. 
As mentioned, to model the effect of the uncertainties on the 
operation results, some scenarios are generated. In the worst 
scenarios, the expected total operation cost may be very high. 
Therefore, a risk management method is used to model the 
effect of the uncertainties on the strategic behavior of the 
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http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information 
5 
Disco in both wholesale and local markets [8]. The CVaR 
method is used to model the Disco’s risk aversion [23] as 
follows: 
 
1
1
1
W
CVaR ω ω
ω
ξ ψ η
α =
= +
− ∑
   (13)  
 0     , 0    .TCω ω ωξ η η ω− − ≤ ≥ ∀  (14) 
The optimal value of ξ is the VaR, and 𝜂𝜂𝜔𝜔 is a variable 
used to model the excess cost over ξ in the scenario 𝜔𝜔. 
D. Final objective function of the UL problem 
The final objective function of the Disco problem is 
described as follows: 
                          ( ){ }Minimize  ETC CVaRβ+                       (15) 
where the risk of Disco in decision making is controlled using 
the risk-aversion parameter 𝛽𝛽. For 𝛽𝛽 = 0 the decision-maker is 
neutral. When 𝛽𝛽 increases the Disco becomes more risk-
averse. The variable set of the Disco problem is described as                   
𝑿𝑿 = �𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷,𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷_𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺 ,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝜔𝜔𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷,𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝐷𝐷,ℎ𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐷𝐷,ℎ𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 ,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐷𝐷,ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝜂𝜂𝜔𝜔, 𝜉𝜉�. 
III. MATHEMATICAL MODELING OF THE LL PROBLEMS 
A. Wholesale DAEM 
The DAEM problem formulation is presented as in (16)-
(29). The objective function of the DAEM presented by (16) is 
the social welfare of the market players consisting of Gencos, 
the transmission network load (TNL), and the Disco, 
respectively. In the last term of this equation, the non-negative 
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 is the bid, and its negative is the offer.  
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, , , , , , ,
_
,
1 1 1 1
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b g t b g t b d t b d t
g b d b
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t t
G B D B
TN Dis
d
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ρ
=
= = = =
−
−
 
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 
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∑
∑∑ ∑∑  (16) 
The formulation of the constraints is reported below. The 
dual variables (Lagrangian multiplier for each constraint of the 
LL problem) are considered at the right side of the colon. 
1) Power balance constraint: The DC power flow constraints 
(17) and (18) are used to model the power balance constraint 
at bus m (the DN location) and other buses, respectively. 
    ( ), ,, ,_ _
 
:  ,  
G TN
n n
TN Dis Dis
m t r tg t t m r n
TN TN
t
g M r
P P B n m tθ θ λ−
∈ ∈Λ
= − ∀ =−∑ ∑     (17) 
( ), ,, _, , :   , ,
G D TN
n n n
TN TN TN
n t r tg t d t n
is
r t
D
n
g M d M r
P L B n n m tθ θ λ−
∈ ∈ ∈Λ
= − ∀ ≠−∑ ∑ ∑   (18) 
2) Constraints of the Disco: The maximum exchange power 
between the Disco and the market is limited by (19). 
              1_ 1_ __ _  : ,   DiTN Dis T s TN TNt
N
t
is
t
D TNP P P tµ µ≤ ≤ ∀         (19) 
3) Constraints of Gencos: The constraint (20) limits the power 
generation of the Gencos. The constraints (21)-(22) consider 
ramp-up (RU) and ramp-down (RD) limitations of the Gencos. 
The upper bounds of energy blocks related to the Gencos are 
limited by (23). The summation of energy blocks of Gencos is 
equal to their total output power, as modeled by (24). 
                   2 _ 2 _, , , :  ,   , 
TN TN TN
g g t g g t g tP P P g tµ µ≤ ≤ ∀              (20) 
3_ 4 _
, 1 , , , , , :  , 1 ,  :  , 1
TN TN TN TN TN TN
g t g t g g t g ini g t g g tP P RD g t P P RD g tµ µ− − ≤ ∀ > − ≤ ∀ = (21) 
5 _
, , 1 ,   
6 _
, , , :  , 1 ,  :  , 1
TN TN TN
g t g t g g t
TN TN TN
g t g ini g g tP P RU g t P P RU g tµ µ−− ≤ ∀ > − ≤ ∀ = (22) 
                 
 7 _ 7 _
, ,, , ,0   :  ,    , , 
TNTN TN TN
b g tb g t b,g,t b,g t b g tρ ρ µ µ≤ ≤ ∀            (23) 
                         1_
, , , ,
1
  :    , TN TN TNg t b g t g t
b
B
P g tρ λ
=
= ∀∑                       (24) 
4) Constraints of TNLs: The constraint (25) limits the TNLs 
consumption. The upper bounds of the energy blocks related 
to the TNLs are limited by (26), and the summation of the 
energy blocks of TNLs is equal to the their energy 
consumption as modeled by (27). 
                  8 _ 8 _, , , ,0  :  ,    , 
TN TN TN TN
d t d t d t d tL L d tµ µ≤ ≤ ∀             (25) 
                   9 _ 9 _, , , , , , , ,0   :  ,    , , 
TN TN TN TN
b d t b d t b d t b d tl l b d tµ µ≤ ≤ ∀             (26) 
                          2 _
, , , ,
1
  :   , TN TN TNd t b d t d t
B
b
L l d tλ
=
= ∀∑                       (27) 
5) Transmission network constraints: The constraint (28) 
indicates the capacity limitation of the TN line from node 𝐺𝐺 to 
node 𝑟𝑟. The constraint (29) defines the range of the TN 
voltage angle, and sets the TN bus as the reference bus. 
      ( ) 10 _ 10 _, , , ,, ,   :  ,  ,  , TN TN TN TN TNn r n r n rn t r n r t n r nt tf B f n r tθ θ µ µ− − −− ≤ − ≤ ∀ ∈Λ       (28) 
11_ 11_ 3_
, , ,, , :  ,   , , 0 :  .2 2n t n sl
TN TN TN
n t n t n t n tack n slackn t t
π π
θ µ µ θ λ= =− ≤ ≤ ∀ = ∀ (29) 
The variable set of the DAEM problem is described as               
𝒀𝒀 = �𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, 𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ,𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏,𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 , 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷,𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡�.  
B. MGs problem 
The MG problem is modeled as (30)-(43). The local market 
is cleared based on uniform prices. For the jth MG, the 
operation problem is modeled by (30) which consists of the 
financial trading with the Disco (the non-negative 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷_𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺 is 
the bid of the Disco to take energy from the MG, and its 
negative is the offer of the Disco to supply energy to the MG), 
the cost of the DGs, and the cost of the IL. 
       ( )
_ _
, ,
_
1
_
, ,
Minimize   
Dis MG Dis MG DG DGT
t j t j j t
MG MG
t j t j
IL I
t
L
MG
C P C P
TC j
C P=
− +
=
+
 
 
 
∑   (30) 
1) Power balance constraint: The power balance of each MG 
is modeled by (31). 
        , , , , , ,
_
,
_ _  :    ,DG MG ESdch Dis MG ESch MGL Dis MGj t j t j t j t j t j t
I
j t
LP P P P P P j tλ+ + = + ∀−     (31) 
2) Power trading limit with the Disco: The power trading 
between the Disco and MG is limited by (32). 
      1_ 1_, , ,
_ _ : ,  ,_   Dis MG Dis MG Dis MG MG MGj j t j j t j tP P P j tµ µ ∀≤ ≤   (32) 
3) Constraints of DGs: The constraint (33) represents the 
limitations of the output power of the DGs. Moreover, the 
other constraints consist of the RU and RD limitations 
described as (34)-(37). 
                  2 _ 2 _, , ,0  : ,  ,
DG DG MG MG
j t j j t j tP P j tµ µ≤ ≤ ∀            (33) 
                 3_, , 1 ,:   , 1
DG DG DG MG
j t j t j j tP P RU j tµ−− ≤ ∀ >           (34) 
                  4 _, , ,:  , 1
DG DG DG MG
j t j ini j j tP P RU j tµ− ≤ ∀ =              (35) 
                  5 _, 1 , ,:   , 1
DG DG DG MG
j t j t j j tP P RD j tµ− − ≤ ∀ >            (36) 
                   6 _, , ,:  , 1 
DG DG DG MG
j ini j t j j tP P RD j tµ− ≤ ∀ =           (37) 
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4) Constraints of interruptible loads: The constraint (38) is 
used to limit the maximum amount of interrupted load. 
             7 _ 7 _, , , ,
_0  : ,  ,MG MG MGL MG MGj t j j t j t j t
ILP P j tµ µγ≤ ∀≤       (38) 
5) Constraints of ESs: The constraints (39) and (40) are used 
to limit the maximum charging and discharging of ES. The 
energy stored in the ES is limited by (41) and the constraints 
(42) and (43) describe the coupling-in-time and the initial 
conditions for the energy stored in the ES, respectively. 
                  8 _ 8 _, , ,0  : ,  ,
ESch ESch MG MG
j t j j t j tP P j tµ µ≤ ≤ ∀            (39) 
                9 _ 9 _, , ,0 : ,  ,
ESdch ESdch MG MG
j t j j t j tP P j tµ µ≤ ≤ ∀            (40) 
               10 _ 10 _ , , , : ,  ,
ES ES ES MG MG
j j t j j t j tE E E j tµ µ≤ ≤ ∀        (41) 
     1_, , 1 , ,, :   , 1
ES ES ch ESch MG
j t j t j j t j t
ESdch dch
j t jE E P j tPη λη−= + − ∀ >    (42) 
     2 _, , , ,,  :   , 1.
ES ES ch ESch MG
j t j ini j j t j t
ESdch dch
j t jE E P j tPη λη= + − ∀ =    (43) 
The variable set of the MG problem is described as 𝒁𝒁 =
�𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷_𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺 ,𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 ,𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ,𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸ℎ,𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸�.  
IV. MATHEMATICAL PROGRAM WITH EQUILIBRIUM 
CONSTRAINT 
Using the KKT conditions detailed in Appendix A, both LL 
problems are replaced with several constraints, regarding 
which the proposed bi-level problem is transformed to the 
single-level problem [24] named as mathematical program with 
equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Then, the non-linear terms, 
i.e. the first and second terms of equation (2), in the UL 
problem are replaced with linear expressions using duality 
theory [24] as presented in Appendix B. The resulting mixed-
integer linear programming (MILP) model is based on the 
linearized form of Equation (15), subject to:  
• Constraints of the Disco: Equations (3)-(14) 
• KKT conditions of wholesale DAEM: Equations (44)-(60) 
• KKT conditions of MGs problems: Equations (61)-(76). 
This kind of problem has been addressed in [26] by 
considering the participation of a virtual power plant (without 
the Disco) in the wholesale energy market, and is proposed in 
this paper in the Disco-centric view. 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
A. Data 
The proposed model is applied on the IEEE 33-bus test 
system as a distribution network connected to the RTS 24-bus 
power system as shown in Fig. 3 to investigate the mutual 
interactions of the Disco with both markets. The input data of 
the distribution network and the power system are given in [9, 
23, 27]. The TNL #17, located at TN bus m=20, is replaced 
with the DN, and bus number 13 is considered as the reference 
bus. In the DN, MG1, MG2, and MG3 are located at buses 28, 
20, and 18, respectively. The RESs have been located at buses 
3, 8, 12, 18, 21, 22, 25, and 33. Moreover, the IL aggregator 
interacts with the DNLs located at buses 8, 24, 25, and 30-32. 
The forecast power generation of wind turbines (WTs) and 
photovoltaic (PV) arrays as the RESs, and the demand of the 
distribution network, are considered as proposed in [9, 28]. 
The price of selling energy by the Disco to DNL [15], the 
offers of the IL aggregator to the Disco, the operation cost of 
RESs, and the cost of MGLs interruption are shown in Fig. 4.  
The bid of DGs for MG1, MG2, and MG3 are 12 $/MWh, 
14 $/MWh, and 11 $/MWh, respectively. The maximum 
power exchange of the Disco with the wholesale market is 50 
MW. The technical and economic data related to the DERs in 
each MG are extracted from [9, 13, 16]. 
  
Fig. 4. Selling energy price to DNL, offers of IL aggregator and RESs, and the 
cost of MGLs interruption. 
B. Results 
The effect of optimal decisions of the Disco on both local 
and wholesale markets are investigated in this sub-section. For 
this purpose, four cases are presented to show the effect of 
different types of Disco’s offers/bids to MGs and modeling the 
distribution network on the local and wholesale markets: 
Case I) Uniform local market price (LMP) considering DN 
Case II) Uniform LMP without DN 
Case III) Different LMPs considering DN 
Case IV) Different LMPs without DN 
In Cases I and II, the uniform bids/offers are sent to MGs by 
the Disco, while different bids/offers are proposed to MGs in 
Cases III and IV by changing 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷_𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺 to 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷_𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺. The DN 
power flow is calculated in Case I (base case) and Case III. 
The network is modeled as single bus in Cases II and IV.  
The results of the four cases are compared with each other. 
B.1. Results of Case I 
The total operation cost of the Disco in each scenario is 
illustrated in Table II. The result are presented for the fourth 
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scenario (𝜔𝜔 = 4), having an occurrence probability higher 
than other scenarios with β=0 (risk-neutral Disco). The market 
clearing price (MCP) and LMP for both wholesale and local 
markets are shown in Fig. 5. The presence of DERs and MGs 
in the DN can change the Disco’s decisions and impact on the 
MCP as shown in Fig. 6. Figs. 7, 8, and 9(a1) show the power 
balance of the power system, MGs, and DN, respectively. 
According to Figs. 5-7 and 9(a1), the behavior of the Disco (in 
the presence of DERs and MGs) reduces the MCPs from 
10.66, 18.20, 11.96, and 10.66 $/MWh to 10.25, 15.97, 11.72, 
and 10.25 $/MWh at hours 2, 15, 22, and 24, respectively. In 
the other hours, the other decision makers of the wholesale 
market determine the market prices. 
TABLE II 
THE AMOUNT OF TOTAL COST IN EACH SCENARIO 
5 4 3 2 1 # Scenario 
-11960 -11200 -11550 -11390 -11680 Total cost ($) 
10 9 8 7 6 # Scenario 
-11500 -11510 -11700 -11800 -11038 Total cost ($) 
15 14 13 12 11 # Scenario 
-11430 -11940 -11410 -12080 -11043 Total cost ($) 
 
Fig. 5. MCP and LMP at each time step.  
 
Fig. 6. The impact of the Disco’s decisions on MCP with DERs and MGs. 
 
Fig. 7. Power balance results in the power system. 
At hour 2, the Disco meets the demand with purchasing 
power from MG3 (Fig. 8(c)) and scheduling of IL and RESs 
(Fig. 9(a1)), which leads to decreasing the purchased power 
from the wholesale market. At hour 3, the same MCP 
reduction does not appear any longer. At hour 3, the 
decreasing of purchased power from the DAEM by the Disco 
cannot change the MCP regarding the high amount of DNL 
and the different amount of TNL and bids/offers of DAEM 
players in this hour in comparison with hour 2. At hour 3, 
decreasing the MCP from 10.25 $/MWh (block 2 of Gencos 6 
and 7) to 9.92 $/MWh (block 1 of Gencos 6 and 7) would 
have occurred if the Disco had experienced a reduction of 
76.998 MW in demand in the wholesale market, which did not 
occur. The same effect of reduction of purchased power from 
the DAEM appears at hour 15 (all MGs supply the DN, Fig. 8, 
and scheduling of IL and RESs, Fig. 9(a)), hour 22 (MG1 and 
MG3 supply the DN), and hour 24 (MG3 supplies the DN). 
In the proposed model, the Disco decides on purchasing 
power from the IL aggregator regarding the cost of 
interruptible loads, the first-stage decisions, and offers of 
RESs. The cost of interruptible load is equal to the offer of the 
IL aggregator and the price of selling power to consumer as 
modeled in the fourth term of equation (2). The results show 
that the purchased power from the IL aggregator has impacts 
on trading power between the Disco with DAEM and MGs as 
well as the DN power losses. The Disco decides to purchase 
power from the IL aggregator at hours 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15, 16, 
and 19-24. At hours 2, 15, 22, and 24, the Disco decreases 
purchasing power from the DAEM, which leads to decreasing 
MCP through purchasing power from ILs. To investigate the 
effect of ILs aggregators on the results, the problem is solved 
without considering the IL aggregator, and the results are 
shown in Fig. 9(a2). In hours 3, 5, 6, and 21 the purchased 
power from the IL aggregator changes the behavior of the 
Disco in trading power with the MGs. In this case, purchasing 
power from MG3 increases at hours 3, 5, and 6, the Disco 
purchases power from MG1 instead of selling power to it at 
hour 6, and the selling power by the Disco to MG1 and MG2 
decreases at hours 3 and 21, respectively. At hours 9, 11, 16, 
19, 20, and 23, without purchasing power from the IL 
aggregator the DN power losses increase from 0.788 MW, 
3.206 MW, 1.812 MW, 2.504 MW, 2.414 MW, and 0.445 
MW to 1.735 MW, 3.900 MW, 2.423 MW, 4.473 MW, 4.246 
MW, and 2.676 MW, respectively. The purchased power from 
the IL aggregator is zero at hours 12 and 13, regarding the 
high price of selling power to consumers, and at hours 4, 7, 8, 
13, 14, 17, and 18, when the low offers of RESs lead to 
purchase power from RESs instead of from the IL aggregator. 
As shown in Figs. 5 and 9(a1), the bids/offers of the Disco 
to the MGs in the local market (LMP) depend on the cost of 
MGLs interruption, the operation cost of DGs, and the 
characteristics of power resources, such as ramp rate 
limitations of each MG and the dynamic behavior of ES of 
MG1. The LMPs are equal to the bid of MG1’s DG at hours 1, 
22, and 23, the bid of MG2’s DG at hours 8, 9, and 11-21, and 
the bid of MG3’s DG at hours 2-6 and 24. At hours 7 and 10, 
the LMP is equal to the cost of MGLs interruption. The Disco 
purchases power from the wholesale market with low MCP to 
supply the DNL and sell power with higher prices to MG1 and 
MG2 at hours 1-7 and 22-24. In addition, the Disco sends its 
bids (14 $/MWh) to MGs with the aim of purchasing part of 
its required power from MGs instead of trading power with 
the DAEM with higher MCP. The Disco utilizes this part of 
power to supply the DNL and to sell energy to MG1 at hours 
13 and 18, and to MG2 at hours 20 and 21. To decrease the 
ETC and the purchased power from the DAEM with high 
MCP, the offers sent by the Disco to the MGs are less than its 
bids to the DAEM. As such, the Disco purchases power as 
much as possible from the MGs at hours 8-12, 14-17, and 19. 
Fig. 8 illustrates that each MG operates its power resources 
and interacts with the Disco to supply its load consumption. 
The results show that MGs receive offers/bids of the Disco in 
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the local market and they decide to purchase/sell power 
from/to it. When the bid of the Disco to MGs is greater/less 
than to the bids of each MG’s power resources, they decide to 
sell/purchase power to/from the Disco. Also, if the bid/offer of 
the Disco is equal to the bid of MG’s power resources, they 
either sell power to the Disco to increase their profit or 
purchase power from the Disco to overcome the functional 
limitation of their power resources. 
B.2. Comparison among the four cases 
The results obtained from the four mentioned cases are 
shown in Fig. 9 and Table III. The Disco decides to interact 
with MGs considering the DN structure (power losses) as well 
as MG location, and also the type of LMP (uniform or 
different). According to Figs. 9(a1) and 9(b), the sum of the 
power exchanges between the Disco and MGs during the 
operation time period for case I are 17.294 MW (MG1), 
12.613 MW (MG2), and 69.058 MW (MG3), and for case II 
are -1.062 MW (MG1), 10.856 MW (MG2), and 43.331 MW 
(MG3). The power exchange between Disco and MGs are 
26.878 MW (MG1), 20.830 MW (MG2), and 71.989 MW 
(MG3) for case III, and 0.500 MW (MG1), 13.830 MW 
(MG2), and 41.955 MW (MG3) for case IV. These specific 
results show that in cases I and III, which model the DN 
structure, the Disco prefers to purchase power from the MG at 
the farthest distance (MG3, MG1, and MG2, respectively) 
instead of selling energy to them, with the purpose of reducing 
the power losses. Therefore, the MG location in the DN can 
significantly change the Disco’s bids/offers to the MGs and 
the DAEM, as shown in Table III. 
The type of LMP (Disco’s bids/offers to MGs) can be 
different from the uniform price. This has important effects on 
trading power between the Disco and MGs as shown in Table 
III (cases I and III) and Figs. 9(a1) and 9(c). For instance, the 
Disco sells power to MG1 due to presenting an offer 14 
$/MWh, 14 $/MWh, and 11 $/MWh, based on uniform LMP, 
at hours 13, 18, and 24, respectively. Different LMPs in case 
III change the behavior of the Disco, so that it purchases 
power from MG1 regarding offers of 19.6 $/MWh, 18.4 
$/MWh, and 12 $/MWh in these hours, respectively. MG2 
prefers to decrease the purchased power from the Disco at 
hours 1-7 and 20-24 from 24.751 MW (case I) to 15.381 MW 
(case III) because of the increased Disco’s offers at these 
hours. The obtained revenue of MG3 from selling power to the 
Disco is significantly reduced in case III by changing the 
Disco’s offers to this MG. Therefore, the type of LMP 
changes the role as well as the cost/revenue of MGs 
interacting with the Disco. The different offers proposed by 
the Disco to MGs in case III improve the ETC from -11540$ 
to -11760$. 
Although MCP at hours 9-20 has the maximum value, i.e. 
18.2 $/MWh in the absence of MGs and DERs, the Disco 
changes MCP from 18.2 to 15.97 $/MWh only at hour 15 in 
case I and at hours 15 and 16 in case II through decreasing the 
purchased power from the DAEM by interacting with MGs, 
the IL aggregator, and the RESs. Since the power losses are 
modeled in case I, the Disco cannot decrease the purchased 
power from the DAEM to a specified amount for changing 
MCP to 15.97 $/MWh at hour 16 (see Table III) in this case. 
In other hours the Disco cannot decrease MCP to 15.97 
$/MWh, since the whole TNLs (with presenting bids equal or 
greater than 18.2 $/MWh) cannot be supplied through the 
maximum capacity of Gencos at this MCP. 
C. Risk analysis 
In this sub-section the effect of the risk aversion parameter 
𝛽𝛽 on the decisions of the Disco is investigated. For this 
purpose, the confidence level 𝛼𝛼 is considered equal to 0.8, and 
𝛽𝛽 changes from 0 to 100. The results, shown in Fig. 10 and 
Tables IV and V, are described in the following sub-sections. 
C.1. Results of case I 
When the risk aversion parameter increases, the Disco 
changes the first decision variables including power exchange 
with the DAEM and MGs to decrease the results of (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ×100% worst scenarios. Regarding Table IV, the risk-averse 
Disco (𝛽𝛽 = 100, typically) decides to change its bids/offers, 
power trading with the wholesale and local markets. For 
example, the bids/offer to local markets changes from 11.60$ 
and 11 $/MWh to 11$ and 12 $/MWh at hours 7 and 24, 
respectively. Also, the demand-supply balance of each MG 
can be influenced by changing the amount of power exchange 
with the Disco regarding the Disco’s risk-averse bids/offers to 
the MGs shown in Table IV. Therefore, the risk parameter has 
important impacts on the first-stage decisions of the Disco that 
change the market outcomes and bids/offers of the Disco in 
the markets. By increasing 𝛽𝛽, the ETC of the Disco increases 
(minus ETC decreases) and the CVaR decreases (minus CVaR 
increases) with respect to Fig. 10. In other words, the risk-
averse decisions of the Disco improve the total cost 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝜔𝜔 in the 
worst scenarios (number 4, 6, and 11) from -11200$, -11038$, 
and -11043$ to -11248$, -11242.5$, and -11240$, 
respectively. Moreover, the difference between the best and 
the worst scenarios decreases from 1040$ to 670$, i.e. 36%, 
where the total costs in each scenario are closer to the ETC 
(obtaining the lower total cost in the worst scenario). 
   
              (a) MG1             (b) MG2               (c) MG3 
Fig. 8. Share of each MG's power resource to supply each MGL.
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(a1) Case I with IL aggregator 
 
 (a2) Case I without IL aggregator 
 
(b) Case II 
 
(c) Case III 
 
(d) Case IV 
Fig. 9. Power balance in the DN in the four cases.  
 
Fig. 10. Sensitivity of ETC and CVaR to risk-aversion parameter 𝛽𝛽 (case I). 
 
TABLE III 
IMPACT OF THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF THE MODEL ON THE DISCO'S BID/OFFER PRICES TO THE DAEM AND TO EACH MG (VALUES IN $/MWH) 
Case IV Case III Case II Case I  
Bidding 
to MG3 
Bidding 
to MG2 
Bidding 
to MG1 
DAEM 
MCP 
Bidding 
to MG3 
Bidding 
to MG2 
Bidding 
to MG1 
DAEM 
MCP 
Bidding 
to MGs 
DAEM 
MCP 
Bidding 
to MGs 
DAEM 
MCP 
Time 
11.0 14.0 12.0 10.68 11.0 14.0 12.0 10.68 12.0 10.68 12.0 10.68 1 
11.0 14.0 12.0 10.25 11.0 14.0 12.0 10.25 11.0 10.25 11.0 10.25 2 
11.0 14.0 12.0 10.25 11.0 14.0 12.0 10.25 11.0 10.25 11.0 10.25 3 
11.0 14.0 12.0 10.25 11.0 14.0 12.0 10.25 11.0 10.25 11.0 10.25 4 
11.0 14.0 12.0 10.25 11.0 14.0 12.0 10.25 11.0 10.25 11.0 10.25 5 
11.0 14.0 12.0 10.25 11.0 14.0 12.0 10.25 10.8 10.25 11.0 10.25 6 
11.0 14.0 12.0 11.26 11.0 14.0 12.0 11.26 11.2 11.26 11.6 11.26 7 
11.0 14.0 12.0 11.96 11.0 14.0 12.0 11.96 12.8 11.96 14.0 11.96 8 
13.8 14.0 13.8 18.20 13.8 14.0 13.8 18.20 15.2 18.20 14.0 18.20 9 
17.0 14.0 12.0 18.20 17.0 14.0 17.0 18.20 14.0 18.20 17.0 18.20 10 
11.0 14.0 12.0 18.20 19.6 14.0 19.6 18.20 14.0 18.20 14.0 18.20 11 
11.0 14.0 13.296 18.20 11.0 14.0 20.0 18.20 14.0 18.20 14.0 18.20 12 
11.0 14.0 13.296 18.20 19.6 14.0 19.6 18.20 14.0 18.20 14.0 18.20 13 
12.8 14.0 12.8 18.20 12.8 14.0 12.8 18.20 14.0 18.20 14.0 18.20 14 
11.0 14.0 12.0 15.97 11.0 14.0 12.0 15.97 14.0 15.97 14.0 15.97 15 
11.4 14.0 13.296 15.97 11.4 14.0 12.0 18.20 14.0 15.97 14.0 18.20 16 
12.8 14.0 12.8 18.20 12.8 14.0 12.8 18.20 14.0 18.20 14.0 18.20 17 
11.0 14.0 18.4 18.20 11.0 14.0 18.4 18.20 14.0 18.20 14.0 18.20 18 
11.0 14.0 12.0 18.20 11.0 14.0 12.0 18.20 14.0 18.20 14.0 18.20 19 
11.0 19.6 12.0 18.20 11.0 19.6 12.0 18.20 14.0 18.20 14.0 18.20 20 
11.0 14.0 12.0 15.97 11.0 14.0 12.0 15.97 14.0 15.97 14.0 15.97 21 
11.0 14.0 12.0 11.72 11.0 14.0 12.0 11.72 11.0 11.72 12.0 11.72 22 
11.0 14.0 12.0 11.09 11.0 14.0 12.0 11.09 11.0 11.09 12.0 11.09 23 
11.0 14.0 12.0 10.25 11.0 14.0 12.0 10.25 11.0 10.25 11.0 10.25 24 
C.2. Comparison among all cases 
 The Disco’s risk-averse decisions in the first-stage decisions 
containing the power purchased from the DA market, as well 
as the power exchange with MGs for all cases, are given in 
Table V. As shown in this Table, the decisions of a risk-averse 
Disco are different from those of a risk-neutral one. Moreover, 
these decisions depend on the type of LMPs and DN structure 
modeling (power losses). When β increases, the power 
purchased from MGs by the Disco changes as shown in Table 
V. For example, for case I, the power purchased from MGs 
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10 
increases at hours 4-6, 13, 23, and 24 and decreases at hours 2, 
3, 7 and 12. This behavior of the Disco changes the sum of the 
power losses during the whole time period of operation. The 
power losses for the risk-neutral Disco are 35.867 MW and 
33.379 MW in cases I and III, respectively and for the risk-
averse Disco are 32.589 MW and 30.683 MW, respectively 
for the same cases. Therefore the risk-averse Disco faces with 
less power losses in comparison with the risk-neutral one. 
TABLE IV 
RISK-NEUTRAL AND RISK-AVERSE DISCO’S DECISIONS IN THE FIRST- AND SECOND-STAGE DECISIONS  
Offer/Bid to MGs 
($/MWh) 
RESs output power 
(MW) 
Power interruption 
(MW) 
Power exchange 
with MG3 (MW) 
Power exchange 
with MG2 (MW) 
Power exchange 
with MG1 (MW) 
Power trading 
with DAEM(MW) 
 
𝛽𝛽 = 100 𝛽𝛽 = 0 𝛽𝛽 = 100 𝛽𝛽 = 0 𝛽𝛽 = 100 𝛽𝛽 = 0 𝛽𝛽 = 100 𝛽𝛽 = 0 𝛽𝛽 = 100 𝛽𝛽 = 0 𝛽𝛽 = 100 𝛽𝛽 = 0 𝛽𝛽 = 100 𝛽𝛽 = 0 Time 
12.0 12.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.433 1.433 -1.526 -1.526 1.843 1.843 18.711 18.711 1 
11.0 11.0 3.300 3.300 2.065 2.538 2.721 2.776 -1.467 -1.467 -1.608 -1.608 17.057 16.470 2 
11.0 11.0 6.200 6.200 6.064 6.491 2.108 2.322 -1.387 -1.387 -1.679 -1.679 15.971 15.287 3 
11.0 11.0 2.559 1.970 0.000 0.000 2.908 2.115 -1.241 -1.241 -1.70 -1.700 14.170 15.631 4 
11.0 11.0 6.100 6.100 0.052 0.896 3.513 3.121 -1.161 -1.161 -1.329 -1.329 18.575 17.992 5 
11.0 11.0 5.130 5.130 1.980 3.523 4.461 3.602 -1.292 -1.292 -1.335 -1.335 19.342 18.488 6 
11.0 11.6 6.008 5.087 0.000 0.000 3.290 4.151 -2.370 -2.370 0.520 1.239 17.155 16.409 7 
14.0 14.0 2.017 2.555 0.000 0.000 3.428 3.428 0.994 0.994 3.479 3.479 17.283 16.691 8 
14.0 14.0 8.315 8.315 2.561 1.833 2.793 2.793 4.135 4.135 2.777 2.777 14.802 15.636 9 
17.0 17.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.309 2.309 4.503 4.503 2.567 2.567 24.240 24.240 10 
14.0 14.0 8.355 8.355 2.755 1.034 0.310 0.310 3.220 3.220 0.120 0.120 25.949 28.304 11 
14.0 14.0 1.465 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.980 0.980 3.220 3.220 -0.180 0.245 26.399 29.713 12 
14.0 14.0 1.696 1.436 0.000 0.000 0.310 0.310 2.850 2.850 0.045 -0.380 28.387 29.288 13 
14.0 14.0 0.000 1.287 0.000 0.000 2.309 2.309 3.730 3.730 1.499 1.499 27.000 24.304 14 
14.0 14.0 7.680 7.680 4.515 4.515 2.540 2.540 3.671 3.671 2.205 2.205 19.987 19.987 15 
14.0 14.0 3.630 3.630 1.400 1.400 2.778 2.778 3.985 3.985 1.825 1.825 23.987 23.987 16 
14.0 14.0 0.000 0.493 0.000 0.000 3.515 3.515 4.226 4.226 1.598 1.598 27.734 25.876 17 
14.0 14.0 5.629 5.629 0.000 0.000 2.840 2.840 2.110 2.110 -0.870 -0.870 28.874 28.874 18 
14.0 14.0 4.525 4.525 3.000 4.000 3.290 3.290 0.720 0.720 0.480 0.480 33.079 31.801 19 
14.0 14.0 1.040 1.040 5.864 5.864 3.630 3.630 -0.850 -0.850 1.120 1.120 31.656 31.656 20 
14.0 14.0 1.980 1.980 2.927 2.603 3.980 3.980 -3.390 -3.390 1.820 1.820 27.168 27.552 21 
12.0 12.0 3.725 3.725 1.888 2.051 5.190 5.190 -4.081 -4.081 3.487 3.487 20.435 20.253 22 
12.0 12.0 2.775 2.775 0.000 3.867 5.334 5.334 -3.285 -3.285 3.762 1.197 18.611 17.160 23 
12.0 11.0 0.755 0.755 2.875 5.502 5.435 5.435 -2.701 -2.701 1.259 -1.306 17.332 17.332 24 
TABLE V 
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE FOUR CASES BASED ON THE RISK-AVERSE DISCO’S FIRST-STAGE DECISIONS (FROM THE DISCO’S POINT OF VIEW)  
𝛽𝛽 = 100 𝛽𝛽 = 0  
Sum of power exchanges with MGs (MW) Power trading with the DAEM (MW) Sum of power exchanges with MGs (MW) Power trading with the DAEM  (MW) 
Case IV Case III Case II Case I Case IV Case III Case II Case I Case IV Case III Case II Case I Case IV Case III Case II Case I Time 
-4.625 1.750 -1.250 1.750 22.358 18.711 18.983 18.711 -4.625 1.750 -1.250 1.750 22.358 18.711 18.983 18.711 1 
0.936 -0.354 0.935 -0.354 17.332 17.057 17.332 17.057 -1.265 -0.299 -1.265 -0.299 17.332 16.470 17.332 16.470 2 
-4.792 -1.104 -2.837 -0.958 21.334 16.121 19.379 15.971 -4.371 -0.744 -4.371 -0.744 18.848 15.287 18.848 15.287 3 
-4.544 -0.033 -4.123 -0.033 17.180 14.170 16.759 14.170 -4.544 -0.826 -4.544 -0.826 18.814 15.631 18.814 15.631 4 
-4.745 0.664 -4.745 1.023 21.337 17.956 21.337 18.575 -4.745 0.657 -4.745 0.631 21.337 17.962 21.337 17.992 5 
-4.274 2.944 -4.695 1.834 21.857 18.019 22.279 19.342 -4.695 1.437 -4.695 0.975 22.279 17.949 22.279 18.488 6 
-3.576 4.680 -4.935 1.440 20.255 13.681 21.614 17.155 -3.576 3.858 -4.935 3.020 22.455 15.505 23.814 16.409 7 
2.304 5.804 -1.780 7.901 18.993 19.787 23.077 17.283 2.304 5.804 1.470 7.901 18.993 19.162 19.827 16.691 8 
10.205 10.205 6.455 9.705 11.616 14.293 15.366 14.802 10.205 10.205 10.205 9.705 12.935 15.122 12.935 15.636 9 
6.349 7.956 3.850 9.379 18.616 24.252 21.115 24.240 6.266 7.956 4.350 9.379 25.295 25.858 27.211 24.240 10 
3.567 7.779 3.650 3.650 24.624 20.704 24.541 25.949 3.650 7.854 3.650 3.650 24.541 24.160 24.541 28.304 11 
4.020 6.312 4.020 4.020 23.537 23.385 23.537 26.399 4.020 6.312 4.020 4.445 25.510 27.940 25.510 29.713 12 
2.780 7.129 2.780 3.205 23.932 23.274 23.932 28.387 2.780 7.054 2.780 2.780 26.004 24.400 26.004 29.288 13 
7.538 7.038 7.538 7.538 20.137 27.665 20.137 27.000 7.538 7.538 7.538 7.538 20.137 24.304 20.137 24.304 14 
8.416 8.269 8.416 8.416 19.987 19.987 19.987 19.987 7.915 7.861 8.340 8.416 19.987 19.987 19.987 19.987 15 
9.088 8.088 9.088 8.588 19.987 24.622 19.987 23.987 9.088 8.088 9.088 8.588 19.987 24.622 19.987 23.987 16 
9.339 8.839 9.339 9.339 22.542 28.387 22.542 27.734 9.339 9.339 9.339 9.339 23.812 25.876 23.812 25.876 17 
4.080 6.572 4.080 4.080 24.816 25.660 24.816 28.874 4.580 6.572 4.080 4.080 24.316 26.047 24.816 28.874 18 
4.490 6.591 4.915 4.490 25.480 30.876 25.055 33.079 4.490 4.490 4.490 4.490 25.480 31.801 25.480 31.801 19 
4.400 4.400 3.900 3.900 26.943 31.120 27.443 31.656 4.400 4.400 3.900 3.900 26.943 31.120 27.443 31.656 20 
2.910 5.660 2.410 2.410 23.628 23.741 24.128 27.168 2.910 5.660 2.410 2.410 23.628 24.416 24.128 27.552 21 
2.096 7.846 1.596 4.596 21.917 17.169 22.417 20.435 2.096 7.846 1.596 4.596 21.917 16.884 22.417 20.253 22 
0.246 5.811 0.246 5.811 21.040 18.611 21.040 18.611 0.246 3.550 0.246 3.246 19.595 16.817 19.595 17.160 23 
2.279 3.993 2.279 3.993 17.332 17.332 17.332 17.332 2.279 3.335 1.428 1.428 17.332 17.332 17.332 17.332 24 
TABLE VI 
Computational Aspects for Different Numbers of MGs 
# Discrete 
Variables 
# Single 
Variables 
# Single 
Equations 
Solution Time 
(s) 
# 
MGs 
13,344 976,743 1,835,357 469.24 3 
14,016 978,379 1,838,289 481.54 5 
14,688 980,015 1,841,221 501.89 7 
15,696 982,469 1,845,619 536.35 10 
17,376 986,559 1,852,949 575.14 15 
18,384 989,013 1,857,347 597.78 18 
D. Sensitivity of the model to the number of MGs 
The proposed model is implemented in GAMS environment 
and solved using the CPLEX12 solver on a core i7, 3.3GHz 
system with 6GB RAM. To discuss the tractability of the 
proposed model, it has been applied to the case study with 
different number of MGs changing from 3 MGs to 18 MGs. 
The results consist of the number of equations and variables as 
well as the simulation time, and are presented in Table VI. As 
shown in this Table, although with increasing the number of 
MGs the number of equations and variables increases, the 
solution time changes in an acceptable way for such problem. 
This example validates the effectiveness of the proposed 
MILP problem when the model’s scale increases. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a decision-making framework for a Disco has 
been presented, in which the Disco interacts with both 
wholesale and local markets. To model such framework, a 
risk-based two-stage stochastic bi-level optimization model 
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has been proposed, in which the upper level decision maker is 
the Disco and the lower levels decision makers are the ISO 
and the MGs operators. The KKT conditions and the duality 
theory have been used to transform the proposed non-linear bi-
level model into a MILP problem. The results show that the 
risk-based decisions of the Disco in both wholesale and local 
markets decrease CVaR. In particular, the risk-averse Disco 
changes its first-stage decisions consisting of bids/offers to 
both markets to decrease CVaR. Therefore, the Disco can 
impact on the market outcomes and can increase 
competitiveness in both markets. 
APPENDIX A: KKT CONDITIONS 
The constraints associated with the KKT conditions for each 
LL problem are formulated as follows: 
• Wholesale DAEM: Stationarity constraints: 
1
_ 3_ 3_ 4 _ 4 _
, , , , 1 , 1
5_ 6 _ 6 _ 7 _ 1_
, , 1 , 1 , ,1          0  
TN Dis TN TN TN TN
n t g t g t g t g t
TN TN TN TN TN
g t g
t
t t tt g t g t g t
λ µ µ µ µ
µ µ µ µ λ
> +
> += =
− − + − + −
+ − + + =
  (44) 
_ 2 _ 2 _ 2 _
, , , , 0 
TN Dis TN TN
n m
TN
n t d t d t d tλ µ µ λ≠ − + + =      (45) 
8_ 8_ 1_
, , , , , , , 0 
TN TN TN TN
b g t b g t b g t g tC µ µ λ− + − =      (46) 
9 _ 9 _ 2 _
, , , , , , , 0 
TN TN TN TN
b d t b d t b d t d tC µ µ λ− − + − =      (47) 
_ _ 1_ 1_
, 0
TN Dis TN Dis TN TN
t n t t tn mC λ µ µ=− + − + =       (48) 
_ _ 10 _ 10 _
, , , , , ,
10 _ 10 _ 11_ 11_ 3_
, , , , , , ,
( ) ( )
              ( )  0
TN TN
TN
TN Dis TN Dis TN TN
n r n t r t n r n r t r n t
r r
TN TN TN TN TN
n r r n t n r t nn t n t n t s k
r
lac
B B
B
λ λ µ µ
µ µ µ µ λ
− −
∈Λ ∈Λ
=−
∈Λ
− − + − +
− − + + =
∑ ∑
∑
   (49) 
Primal, dual, and complementary constraints:  
( ) ( )1_ _ 1 ___ _0   0 , 0   0 TN TN Dis TTN Dis TN DiN TN Dist t t t sP P P Pµ µ≤ ⊥ − ≥ ≤ ⊥ − ≥  (50) 
( ) ( )2 _ 2 _  , , , , ,0  0 , 0   0TN TN TN TN TNd t d t d t d t d tL L Lµ µ≤ ⊥ ≥ ≤ ⊥ − ≥    (51) 
( ) ( )3_ 3_, , , ,0   0 , 0   0 TN TN TN TNg t g t g t g g tP P Pµ µ≤ ⊥ ≥ ≤ ⊥ − ≥    (52) 
( ) ( )4 _ 5_, , 1 , , , ,0   0  , 0  0TN TN TN TN TN TNg t g g t g t g t g g ini g tRD P P RD P Pµ µ−≤ ⊥ − + ≥ ≤ ⊥ − + ≥ (53) 
( ) ( )6 _ 7 _, , , 1 , , ,0   0 , 0   0TN TN TN TN TN TNg t g g t g t g t g g t g iniRU P P RU P Pµ µ−≤ ⊥ − + ≥ ≤ ⊥ − + ≥   (54) 
( ) ( )8_ 8_, , , , , , , , ,0   0 0 , 0   0TN TN TN TN TNb g t b g t b g t b g b g tµ ρ µ ρ ρ≤ ⊥ − ≥ ≤ ⊥ − ≥      (55) 
( ) ( )9 _ 9 _  , , , , , , , , , ,0   0 0 , 0  0TN TN TN TN TNb g t b d t b g t b d t b d tl l lµ µ≤ ⊥ − ≥ ≤ ⊥ − ≥  (56) 
( )( ) ( )( )10 _ 10 _, , , , , , , ,0   0 , 0   0TN TN TN TNn r t n r n t r t n r n r t n r n r n t r tB f f Bµ θ θ µ θ θ− − − −≤ ⊥ − + ≥ ≤ ⊥ − − ≥  (57) 
( )( ) ( )11_ 11_, , , ,0   0 , 0  0  2 2TN TNn t n t n t n tπ πµ θ µ θ≤ ⊥ − ≥ ≤ ⊥ − ≥    (58) 
_ 1_ 2 _ 3_
, , , ,, , ,    , Unrestricted
TN Dis TN TN TN
n t g t d t n tλ λ λ λ      (59) 
where each equation is linearized as (60), in which 𝐷𝐷1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and 
𝐷𝐷2
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 are large enough values and 𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is a binary variable.  
1 20 0 0, 0, , (1 )
TN TN TN TNa b a M U ba b M U≤ ⊥ ⇒ ≥ −≥ ≥ ≤ ≤  (60) 
• MGs problem: Stationarity constraints: 
_ 2 _ 2 _ 3_
, , , , 1
3_ 4 _ 5_ 5_ 6 _
, 1 , , , 1 ,1 1 1
 
 0
DG Dis MG MG MG MG
j j t j t j t j t t
MG MG MG MG MG
j t j t j t j t j tt t t
C λ µ µ µ
µ µ µ µ µ
>
+ += > =
− − + + −
+ − + − =
(61) 
_ _ 1_ 1_
, , , 0
Dis MG Dis MG MG MG
t j t j t j tC λ µ µ− + − + =         (62) 
_ _ 7 _ 7 _
, , , , 0
IL MG Dis MG MG MG
j t j t j t j tC λ µ µ− − + =          (63) 
_ 8_ 8_ 1_ 2 _
, ,1 1, , ,
 0Dis MG MG MG ch MG ch MGj t j t j t j j tt ttj jλ µ µ η λ η λ> =− + + + =  (64) 
1
_ 9 _ 9 _ 1_ 2 _
, , , , 1,
 0Dis MG MG MG dch MG dch MGj t j t j t j j j ttt j tλ µ µ η λ η λ> =− − + − − =
 (65) 
10 _ 10 _ 1_ 1_
1 1
2 _
, , , , 1 , 0
MG MG MG MG MG
j t j t j t j tj t tt
µ µ λ λ λ
> =+
− + − + − =    (66) 
Primal, dual, and complementary constraints:  
( ) ( )1_ _ _ 1_ _ _, , , ,0 , 0 0 0   MG Dis MG Dis MG MG Dis MG Dis MGj t j j t j t j t jP P P Pµ µ≤ ⊥ ≤− ≥ ⊥ − ≥    (67) 
( ) ( )2 _ 2 _, , , ,0 0  ,0- 0MG DG DG MG DGj t j j t j t j tP P Pµ µ≤ ⊥ ≥ ≤ ⊥ ≥     (68) 
( ) ( )3_ 4 _, , , 1 , , ,0  0 , 0 0  MG DG DG DG MG DG DG DGj t j j t j t j t j j t j iniRU P P RU P Pµ µ−− + − +≤ ⊥ ≥ ≤ ⊥ ≥    (69) 
( ) ( )5 _ 6 _, , 1 , , , ,0 0 , 0 0 MG DG DG DG MG DG DG DGj t j j t j t j t j j ini j tRD P P RD P Pµ µ−≤ ⊥ ≥ −⊥+ +≤ ≥−    (70) 
( ) ( )7 _ _ 7 _ _, , , , ,0 0 ,0- 0MG MG MGL IL MG MG IL MGj t j j t j t j t j tP P Pµ γ µ≤ ⊥ ⊥≤ ≥≥   (71) 
( ) ( )8_ 8_, , , ,0 0  , 00MG ESch ESch MG ESchj t j j t j t j tP P Pµ µ≤ ⊥ ≥ ⊥≤− ≥    (72) 
( ) ( )9 _ 9 _, , , ,0 0  ,0 0MG ESdch ESdch MG ESdchj t j j t j t j tP P Pµ µ≤ ⊥ ≥ ≤− ⊥ ≥   (73) 
( ) ( )10 _ 10 _, , , ,  ,0 0 0 0MG ES ES MG ES ESj t j j t j t j t jE E E Eµ µ≤ ⊥ ≥ −≤− ⊥ ≥   (74)
1_ 2 _
, , ,
_ , ,    , UnrestrictedMG MGj t j t j
Dis MG
tλ λ λ           (75) 
where each equation is linearized as Eq. (76), in which 𝐷𝐷1𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺 
and 𝐷𝐷2𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺 are large enough values and 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺 is a binary variable.  
1 20 0 0, 0, , (1 )
MG MG MG MGa b a M U ba b M U≤ ⊥ ⇒ ≥ −≥ ≥ ≤ ≤   (76) 
APPENDIX B: LINEARIZATION 
In this section, the dual theory is used to linearize the non-
linear terms including the cost of trading power with DAEM 
(𝜆𝜆𝐹𝐹,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇−𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇−𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷) as well as the cost/revenue of exchanging 
power with MGs (𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷−𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷−𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺), described as follows: 
• Cost of trading power with the DAEM: According to the 
strong dual theory approach, equation (77) is obtained. 
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  (77) 
For simplification, the right-hand side of this equation is 
replaced with 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and the equation is rewritten as (78). 
_ _
, , , , , , , ,
1 1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( )
T
TN Dis TN Dis TN TN TN TN TN
t t t t b g t b g t b d t b d t
t t g b d
T G B D B
b
d C P d C C l Hρ
= = = = = =
 
  = − −  
 
∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑  (78) 
The left-hand side of equation (78) is transformed to the 
non-linear term of (2) as follows. By multiplying equation (48) 
with its variable, equation (79) is obtained. Using (50), the 
equations (80) and (81) are obtained, regarding which (79) is 
transformed into (82). Using (82), equation (78) is transformed 
into (83). 
_ _ _ _ 1_ _ 1_ _
,
TN Dis TN Dis TN Dis TN Dis TN TN Dis TN TN Dis
t t n t t t t t tC P P P Pλ µ µ= − +   (79) 
( )1_ _ _ 1_ _ 1_ _0    TN TN Dis TN Dis TN TN Dis TN TN Dist t t t tP P P Pµ µ µ− = ⇒ =   (80) 
( )1_ _ _ 1_ _ 1_ _0  TN TN Dis TN Dis TN TN Dis TN TN Dist t t t tP P P Pµ µ µ− = ⇒ =    (81) 
_ _ 1_ _ 1_ _ _
,
_  TN Dis TN Dis TN DTN Dis TN TN Dis TN TN Dism t t t t t
i
t
sP C P P Pλ µ µ= + −  (82) 
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• Cost/revenue of exchanging power with MGs: The 
equation (84) is obtained using the strong duality theory.  
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For simplification, the second term of the right-hand side of 
(84) is replaced with 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺 , regarding which (85) is obtained. 
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t t
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The left-hand side of equation (85) is transformed into the 
non-linear term of (2) as follows. By multiplying equation (62) 
with its variable, equation (86) is obtained. Using (67), 
equations (87) and (88) are obtained, regarding which (86) is 
transformed into (89). Using (89), equation (85) is transformed 
into (90). 
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